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Abstract
In multilevel systems it is important to avoid unwanted indirect information ﬂow from higher levels
to lower levels, namely the so called covert channels. Initial studies of information ﬂow analysis were
performed by abstracting away from time and probability. It is already known that systems that
are considered to be secure may turn out to be insecure when time or probability are considered.
Recently, work has been done in order to consider also aspects either of time or of probability, but
not both. In this paper we propose a general framework, based on Probabilistic Timed Automata,
where both probabilistic and timing covert channels can be studied. We deﬁne a Non-Interference
security property that allows one to express information ﬂow in a timed and probabilistic setting,
and we compare the property with analogous properties deﬁned in settings where either time or
probability or none of them are taken into account. This allows to classify properties depending
on their discerning power.
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1 Introduction
In a multilevel system every agent is conﬁned in a bounded security level;
information can ﬂow from a certain agent to another agent only if the level of
the former is lower than the level of the latter. Access rules can be imposed by
the system in order to control direct unwanted transmission from higher levels
to lower levels; however, it could be possible to transmit information indirectly
by using system side eﬀects. Usually, this kind of indirect transmissions, called
covert channels, do not violate the access rules imposed by the system.
The existence of covert channels has led to the more general approach
of information ﬂow security, which aims at controlling the way information
may ﬂow among diﬀerent entities. The idea is to try to directly control the
whole ﬂow of information, rather than only the direct communication among
agents. In [12] the authors introduce the notion of Non-Interference, stating,
intuitively, that low level agents should not be able to deduce anything about
the activity of high level agents. By imposing some information ﬂow rules, it
is possible to control direct and indirect leakages, as both of them give rise to
unwanted information ﬂows.
In the literature, there are many diﬀerent deﬁnitions of security based on
the information ﬂow idea, and each is formulated in some system model (see,
e.g., [12,20,13,10,11,9,5,1]). Most of the properties considered are based on
analysis of information ﬂow that does not take into consideration aspects of
time or probability, and therefore they are not useful to check the existence of
probabilistic or timing covert channels. To overcome this, a signiﬁcant work
has been done in order to extend the study by considering either time (see,
e.g., [11,9,5]) or probability (see, e.g., [13,1,8]).
This has required the use of descriptive means for systems which allow
expressing time and probability. Timed Automata have been introduced by
Alur and Dill [3] as an extension of ω-Automata to describe real-time sys-
tems. Timed Automata are equipped with variables measuring time, called
clocks. Transitions are guarded by clock constraints, which compare the value
of a clock with some constant, and by reset updates, which reset a clock to
the initial value 0. Extensions with probability have been proposed (e.g.
in [2,6,15,16]). In this paper we are interested in a general framework where
both probabilistic and timing covert channels can be studied. For the de-
scription of systems we introduce a particular class of Probabilistic Timed
Automata (PTAs) well-suited for the analysis of information ﬂow security
properties.
The framework of PTAs allows speciﬁcation of timed systems showing a
probabilistic behavior in an intuitive and succinct way. Therefore, within the
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framework of PTAs, where time and probabilities are taken into considera-
tion, the modeler can describe, in the same speciﬁcation, diﬀerent aspects of
a system, and analyze on a single model real-time properties, performance
and reliability properties (by using classical model checking techniques), and
information ﬂow security properties useful to detect both probabilistic and
timing covert channels.
In Section 2 we present our model of Probabilistic Timed Automata, and
we recall the deﬁnitions of Probabilistic Automata, Timed Automata and Non-
deterministic Systems. We deﬁne bisimulation equivalences and operations for
all these models. In Section 3 we deﬁne the Non-Interference security property
in a probabilistic timed setting described by Probabilistic Timed Automata.
The concept of Non-Interference was proposed originally in a purely nondeter-
ministic setting [12,20,10]. We show here that this concept, together with the
analogous concepts for Probabilistic Automata and Timed Automata, can be
expressed in a unique framework where both probability and time are consid-
ered. Time and probability allow discovering that systems that in a nondeter-
ministic setting are considered to be secure, are instead insecure. Time only
and probability only give incomparable discerning powers, while having both
time and probability gives a discerning power greater than the ones given by
each of them. In Section 4 we brieﬂy discuss a property, Non Deducibility on
Composition, which, at any of the levels of description considered, is stronger
then Non-Interference. A classiﬁcation of Non Deducibility on Composition
properties analogous to the one for Non-Interference could be given.
2 Formalisms
We recall the deﬁnition of Probabilistic Timed Automata, operations and
bisimulation for these automata, which we proposed in [17]. This model is
inspired by models of Probabilistic Timed Automata in the literature (see, as
examples, [6,15,2]). Probabilistic Automata are deﬁned as a particular case.
We recall also the deﬁnitions of Timed Automata ([3]) and of Nondeterminis-
tic Systems.
Let us assume a set X of positive real variables called clocks. A valuation
over X is a mapping v : X → IR≥0 assigning real values to clocks. For a
valuation v and a time value t ∈ IR≥0, let v+ t denote the valuation such that
(v + t)(x) = v(x) + t, for each clock x ∈ X.
The set of constraints over X, denoted Φ(X), is deﬁned by the following
grammar, where φ ranges over Φ(X), x ∈ X, c ∈ Q and ∼∈ {<,≤,=, =, >,
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≥}:
φ ::= x ∼ c |φ ∧ φ | ¬φ |φ∨ φ | true
We write v |= φ when the valuation v satisﬁes the constraint φ. Formally,
v |= x ∼ c iﬀ v(x) ∼ c, v |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iﬀ v |= φ1 and v |= φ2, v |= ¬φ iﬀ v |= φ,
v |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iﬀ v |= φ1 or v |= φ2, and v |= true.
Let B ⊆ X; with v[B] we denote the valuation resulting after resetting all
clocks in B. More precisely, v[B](x) = 0 if x ∈ B, v[B](x) = v(x), otherwise.
Finally, with 0 we denote the valuation with all clocks reset to 0, namely
0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X.
Deﬁnition 2.1 A Probabilistic Timed Automaton (PTA) is a tuple A =
(Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π), where:
• Σ is a ﬁnite alphabet of actions.
• X is a ﬁnite set of positive real variables called clocks.
• Q is a ﬁnite set of states and q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
• δ ⊆ Q × Σ ∪ {τ} × Φ(X) × 2X × Q is a ﬁnite set of transitions. The
symbol τ represents the silent or internal move. For a state q, we denote
with start(q) the set of transitions with q as source state, i.e. the set
{(q1, a, φ, B, q2) ∈ δ | q1 = q}.
• Inv : Q → Φ(X) is a function assigning a constraint φ ∈ Φ(X) (called state
invariant) to each state in Q.
• Π = {π1, . . . , πn} is a ﬁnite set of probability distributions as functions πi :
δ → [0, 1], for any i = 1, . . . , n, where πi(e) is the probability of performing
the transition e. We require that
∑
e∈start(q) πi(e) ∈ {0, 1} for any i and q.
Examples of PTAs with |Π| = 1 are in Figures 1, 2 and 3.
A conﬁguration of A is a pair (q, v), where q ∈ Q is a state of A, and v
is a valuation over X. The initial conﬁguration of A is represented by (q0, 0)
and the set of all the conﬁgurations of A is denoted with SA.
There is a discrete transition step from a conﬁguration si = (qi, vi) to a
conﬁguration sj = (qj , vj) through action (a, π) ∈ (Σ ∪ {τ}) × Π, written
si
(a,π)
−→ sj , if there is a transition e = (qi, a, φ, B, qj) ∈ δ such that π(e) > 0,
vi |= φ ∧ Inv(qi), vj = vi[B] and vj |= Inv(qj).
There is a continuous timed step from a conﬁguration si = (qi, vi) to a
conﬁguration sj = (qj, vj) through time t ∈ IR
>0, written si
t
−→ sj , if qj = qi,
vj = (vi + t) and ∀t
′ ∈ [0, t] vi + t
′ |= Inv(qi).
Given a conﬁguration s = (qi, vi), Adm(s) = {(qi, a, φ, B, q) ∈ δ | vi |= φ}
is the set of transitions executable by an automaton from conﬁguration s; a
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transition in Adm(s) is said to be enabled in s. Given two conﬁgurations
si = (qi, vi), sj = (qj, vj) and (a, π) ∈ (Σ ∪ {τ}) × Π, Adm(si, (a, π), sj) =
{e = (qi, a, φ, B, qj) ∈ δ | π(e) > 0 ∧ vi |= φ ∧ vj = vi[B]} is the
set of transitions leading from conﬁguration si to conﬁguration sj through a
transition step labeled with (a, π). A conﬁguration s = (qi, vi) is terminal iﬀ
Adm(s′) = ∅ for all s′ = (qi, vi + t) where t ∈ IR
≥0; ST denotes the set of
terminal conﬁgurations.
For conﬁgurations si, sj, and α ∈ ((Σ ∪ {τ})×Π) ∪ IR
>0, the probability
P (si, α, sj) of reaching conﬁguration sj from conﬁguration si through a step
labeled with α, is deﬁned as
P (si, α, sj) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
P
e∈Adm(si,α,sj)
π(e)
P
e∈Adm(si)
π(e)
if si
α
−→ sj, α = (a, π) ∈ (Σ ∪ {τ})× Π
1 if si
α
−→ sj, α ∈ IR
>0
0 if si 
α
−→ sj
The probability of executing a transition step from a conﬁguration s is
chosen according to the values returned by the function π among all the
transitions enabled in s, while the probability of executing a timed step la-
beled with t ∈ IR>0 is set to the value 1. Intuitively, an automaton chooses
non-deterministically a distribution π for executing a transition step (selected
probabilistically among all the transitions enabled in s), or lets time pass
performing a timed step.
An execution fragment starting from s0 is a ﬁnite sequence of timed and
transition steps σ = s0
α1−→ s1
α2−→ s2
α3−→ . . .
αk−→ sk, where s0, s1, . . . , sk ∈ SA
and αi ∈ ((Σ ∪ {τ})× Π)∪ IR
>0. ExecFrag is the set of execution fragments
and ExecFrag(s) is the set of execution fragments starting from s. We deﬁne
last(σ) = sk and |σ| = k. The execution fragment σ is called maximal iﬀ
last(σ) ∈ ST .
For any j < k, σj is the sequence of steps s0
α1−→ s1
α2−→ . . .
αj
−→ sj .
If |σ| = 0 we put P (σ) = 1, else, if |σ| = k ≥ 1, we deﬁne P (σ) =
P (s0, α1, s1) · . . . · P (sk−1, αk, sk).
An execution is either a maximal execution fragment or an inﬁnite se-
quence s0
α1−→ s1
α2−→ s2
α3−→ . . ., where s0, s1 . . . ∈ SA and α1, α2, . . . ∈
(Σ ∪ {τ} × Π) ∪ IR>0. We denote with Exec the set of executions and with
Exec(s) the set of executions starting from s. Finally, let σ ↑ denote the set
of executions σ′ such that σ ≤prefix σ
′, where preﬁx is the usual preﬁx relation
over sequences.
Executions and execution fragments of a PTA arise by resolving both the
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nondeterministic and the probabilistic choices [15]. To resolve the nondeter-
ministic choices of a PTA, we introduce schedulers of PTAs.
A scheduler of a PTA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π) is a function F from
ExecFrag to Π∪ IR>0. With FA we denote the set of schedulers of A. Given
a scheduler F ∈ FA and an execution fragment σ, we assume that F is deﬁned
for σ iﬀ ∃s ∈ SA and a ∈ Σ ∪ {τ} such that last(σ)
F (σ)
−→ s if F (σ) ∈ IR>0 or
last(σ)
(a,F (σ))
−→ s if F (σ) ∈ Π.
For a scheduler F ∈ FA we deﬁne ExecFrag
F (resp. ExecF ) as the set
of execution fragments (resp. executions) σ = s0
α1−→ s1
α2−→ s2
α3−→ . . . of A
such that, for any 0 < i < |σ|:
• if αi ∈ IR
>0, then F (σi−1) = αi;
• if αi = (a, π), then F (σ
i−1) = π.
A scheduler should also respect the nonZeno condition of divergent times.
Formally we have that for any inﬁnite sequence σ = s0
α1−→ s1
α2−→ . . . in
ExecF the sum
∑
αi∈IR
>0 αi diverges.
Assuming the basic notions of probability theory (see e.g. [14]) we deﬁne
the probability space on the executions starting in a given conﬁguration s ∈
SA as follows. Given a scheduler F , let Exec
F (s) be the set of executions
starting in s, ExecFragF (s) be the set of execution fragments starting in s,
and ΣFF ield(s) be the smallest sigma ﬁeld on Exec
F (s) that contains the basic
cylinders σ ↑, where σ ∈ ExecFragF (s). The probability measure ProbF is
the unique measure on ΣFF ield(s) such that Prob
F (σ ↑) = P (σ).
Let A be a PTA, F ∈ FA, αˆ stand for a if α = (a, π) or α = a ∈ IR
>0
and for ε (the empty string) if α = (τ, π), s ∈ SA and C ⊆ SA. Given the
set ExecF (τ ∗αˆ, C) of executions that lead to a conﬁguration in C via a se-
quence belonging to the set of sequences τ∗αˆ, we deﬁne ExecF (s, τ ∗αˆ, C) =
ExecF (τ ∗αˆ, C) ∩ ExecF (s). Given a scheduler F , we deﬁne the probability
ProbFA(s, τ
∗αˆ, C) = ProbFA(Exec
F (s, τ ∗αˆ, C)).
Bisimilarity is widely accepted as the ﬁnest extensional behavioral equiv-
alence one would want to impose on systems, and it may be used to verify
a property of a system by assessing the bisimilarity of the system considered
with a system one knows to enjoy the property.
The bisimulation of a system by another system is based on the idea of
mutual step-by-step simulation. Intuitively, two systems A and A′ are bisim-
ilar, if whenever one of the two systems executes a certain action and reaches
a conﬁguration s, the other system is able to simulate this single step by exe-
cuting the same action and reaching a conﬁguration s′ which is again bisimilar
to s. A weak bisimulation is a bisimulation that does not take into account τ
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(internal) moves. Hence, whenever a system simulates an action of the other
system, it can also execute some internal τ actions before and after the execu-
tion of that action. A branching bisimulation is, instead, a weak bisimulation
where τ moves are allowed only before the execution of the action to simulate.
In order to abstract away from τ moves, Milner [22] introduces the notion
of observable step, which consists of a single visible action α preceded and
followed by an arbitrary number (including zero) of internal moves. Such
moves are described by a weak transition relation =⇒, deﬁned as
α
=⇒= (
τ
−→
)∗
α
−→ (
τ
−→)∗, where −→ is the classical strong relation, and
τ
=⇒= (
τ
−→)∗. It
is worth noting that with such a deﬁnition a weak internal transition
τ
=⇒ is
possible even without performing any internal action.
For the deﬁnition of weak bisimulation in the fully probabilistic setting,
Baier and Hermanns [4] replace Milner’s weak internal transitions s
τ
=⇒ s′ by
the probability Prob(s, τ ∗, s′) of reaching conﬁguration s′ from s via internal
moves. Similarly, for visible actions α, Baier and Hermanns deﬁne
α
=⇒ by
means of the probability Prob(s, τ ∗α, s′). The probabilistic model we have
chosen for PTAs is that of fully probabilistic systems. In such a model, as
proved in [4], the two relations of weak bisimulation and branching bisimula-
tion do coincide.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π) be a PTA. A weak bisimula-
tion on A is an equivalence relation R on SA such that, for all (s, s
′) ∈ R,
C ∈ SA/R and schedulers F ∈ FA, there exists a scheduler F
′ ∈ FA such that
ProbFA(s, τ
∗α, C) = ProbF
′
A (s
′, τ ∗α, C) ∀α ∈ Σ ∪ {τ} ∪ IR>0
and vice versa.
Two conﬁgurations s, s′ are called weakly bisimilar on A (denoted s ≈A s
′) iﬀ
(s, s′) ∈ R for some weak bisimulation R.
Two PTAs A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π) and A
′ = (Σ′, X ′, Q′, q′0, δ
′, Inv′,Π′)
such that Q ∩Q′ = ∅, X ∩X ′ = ∅ and Π ∩Π′ = ∅ are called weakly bisimilar
(denoted by A ≈ A′) if, given the PTA Aˆ = (Σ ∪ Σ′, X ∪ X ′, Q ∪ Q′, q0, δ ∪
δ′, ˆInv,Π ∪ Π′) with
ˆInv(q) =
⎧⎨
⎩
Inv(q) if q ∈ Q
Inv′(q) if q ∈ Q′
and with FAˆ = FA ∪ FA′, it holds (q0, 0) ≈Aˆ (q
′
0, 0), where the valuation 0 is
deﬁned over all clocks of the set X ∪X ′.
Proposition 2.3 It is decidable whether two PTAs are weakly bisimilar.
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Proof. It is easy to modify the algorithm given in [18] to deal with state
invariants and with a ﬁnite set of probability functions instead of a single
probability function. 
We deﬁne operations of restriction and hiding on PTAs.
We assume a PTA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π) and a set L ⊆ Σ of actions.
Deﬁnition 2.4 The restriction of a PTA A with respect to the set of actions
L is A \ L = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ
′, Inv,Π′), where:
• δ′ = {(q, a, φ, B, q′) ∈ δ | a ∈ L}.
• π′ ∈ Π′ iﬀ π ∈ Πwhere, for all e = (q, a, φ, B, q′) ∈ δ′, π′(e) = π(e)P
e′∈δ′∩start(q) π(e
′)
.
The second condition is assumed in order to normalize the probability of
each transition according to the ones remaining after the restriction. Thanks
to this rule the condition
∑
e∈start(q) π
′(e) ∈ {0, 1} continues to be true for
each state q of A \ L.
Deﬁnition 2.5 The hiding of a transition e = (q, a, φ, B, q′) with respect to
the set of actions L (written e/L) is deﬁned as:
e/L =
⎧⎨
⎩
e if a ∈ L
(q, τ, φ, B, q′) if a ∈ L
The hiding of a PTA A with respect to the set of actions L is given by
A/L = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ
′, Inv,Π′), where δ′ = {e/L | e ∈ δ}, and Π′ = {π′|∃π ∈
Π.∀e′ ∈ δ′ π′(e′) =
∑
e∈δ:e/L=e′ π(e)}.
Proposition 2.6 Given a PTA A, A \ L and A/L are PTAs for all L ⊆ Σ.
We introduce Probabilistic Automata as a subcase of PTAs.
Deﬁnition 2.7 A Probabilistic Automaton (PA) is a PTA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ,
Inv,Π), where X = ∅, φ = true for every e = (q, a, φ, B, q′) ∈ δ and Inv(q) =
true for every state q ∈ Q.
As X = ∅, there are no valuations of clocks, and therefore a conﬁgura-
tion reduces to a state. Transitions and state invariants of a PA may have
as a constraint only the condition true. Moreover, since for PA we abstract
from time, we assume that for each execution σ of a PA there is no scheduler
F ∈ FA such that F (σ) ∈ IR
>0.
R. Lanotte et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 153 (2006) 177–193184
We recall the deﬁnitions of clock equivalence [3]. Clock equivalence is a
ﬁnite index equivalence relation permitting to group sets of evaluations and
to have decidability results.
Let A be a PTA; with CA we denote the greatest constant that appears in
A.
Let us consider the equivalence relation ∼ over clock valuations containing
precisely the pairs (v, v′) such that:
• for each clock x, either v(x) = v′(x), or both v(x) and v′(x) are greater
than CA, with CA the largest integer appearing in clock constraints over x;
• for each pair of clocks x and y with v(x) ≤ CA and v(y) ≤ CA it holds that
fract(v(x)) ≤ fract(v(y)) iﬀ fract(v′(x)) ≤ fract(v′(y)) (where fract(·) is
the fractional part);
• for each clock x with v(x) ≤ CA, fract(v(x)) = 0 iﬀ fract(v
′(x)) = 0.
As proved in [3], v ∼ v′ implies that, for any φ ∈ Φ(X) with constants less
or equal than CA, v |= φ iﬀ v
′ |= φ.
With [v] we denote the equivalence class {v′ | v ≈ v′}. The set of equiva-
lence classes V = {[v] | v is a valuation} is ﬁnite, and with |V | we denote its
cardinality.
Given a PTA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π), we call untime(A) the PA ob-
tained as the region automaton of A, with probability functions chosen accord-
ing to Π. Intuitively, the region automaton (see [3]) is obtained by considering
timed regions as states, where a timed region is a pair (q, φ), where q ∈ Q
and φ ∈ Φ(X), containing every conﬁguration (q, vi) such that vi |= φ. Note
that in the region automaton there is a step between regions r and r′ with
symbol (a, π) if and only if there is an admissible run s
t
−→ s′′
(a,π)
−→ s′ of
the PTA such that t ∈ IR>0 and where s ∈ r and s′ ∈ r′. More precisely,
untime(A) = (Σ ∪ {λ}, ∅, Q× [V ], (q0, [v0]), δ
′, Inv′,Π′) where:
• ((q, [v]), λ, true, ∅, (q′, [v′])) ∈ δ′ iﬀ q = q′, v′ = v + t for some time t ∈ IR>0
and v + t′ |= Inv(q) ∀t′ ∈ [0, t];
• ((q, [v]), a, true, ∅, (q′, [v′])) ∈ δ′ iﬀ (q, a, φ, B, q′) ∈ δ, v |= φ ∧ Inv(q), v′ =
v[B] and v′ |= Inv(q′);
• Inv′(q, [v]) = true ∀(q, [v]) ∈ Q× [V ];
• π ∈ Π′ iﬀ either π(e) = 1 for some e = ((q, [v]), λ, true, ∅, (q′, [v′])), or,
there exists π′ ∈ Π such that, for all e = ((q, [v]), a, true, ∅, (q′, [v′])) ∈ δ′,
π(e) =
∑
e′∈S π
′(e′) where S = {(q, a, φ, B, q′) ∈ δ | v |= φ, v′ = v[B]}.
We recall the deﬁnition of Timed Automata ([3]).
Deﬁnition 2.8 A Timed Automaton (TA) is a tuple A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv),
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where Σ, X, Q, q0, δ and Inv are deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.1.
As for PTAs, a conﬁguration of A is a pair (q, v), where q ∈ Q is a state of
A, and v is a valuation over X. The initial conﬁguration of A is represented
by (q0, 0) and the set of all the conﬁgurations of A is denoted with SA.
There is a discrete transition step from a conﬁguration si = (qi, vi) to a
conﬁguration sj = (qj , vj) through action a ∈ Σ ∪ {τ}, written si
a
−→ sj , if
there is a transition e = (qi, a, φ, B, qj) ∈ δ such that vi |= φ, and vj = vi[B].
Continuous timed steps are as for PTAs.
Deﬁnition 2.9 Let A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv) be a TA. A weak bisimulation
on A is an equivalence relation R ⊆ SA × SA such that for all (s, r) ∈ R it
holds that ∀α ∈ Σ ∪ {τ} ∪ IR>0:
• if s
α
−→ s′, then there exists r′ such that r
α
=⇒ r′ and (s′, r′) ∈ R;
• conversely, if r
α
−→ r′, then there exists s′ such that s
α
=⇒ s′ and (s′, r′) ∈ R.
Two conﬁgurations s, r are called weakly bisimilar on A (denoted s ≈A r) iﬀ
(s, r) ∈ R for some weak bisimulation R.
Two TAs A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv) and A
′ = (Σ′, X ′, Q′, q′0, δ
′, Inv′) such that
Q ∩Q′ = ∅ and X ∩X ′ = ∅ are called weakly bisimilar (denoted by A ≈ A′)
if, given the TA Aˆ = (Σ∪Σ′, X ∪X ′, Q∪Q′, q0, δ∪ δ
′, ˆInv), it holds (q0, 0) ≈Aˆ
(q′0, 0), where
ˆInv is deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2.2.
Proposition 2.10 It is decidable whether two TAs are weakly bisimilar.
Proof. See [19] and [7]. 
We deﬁne operations of restriction and hiding on TAs.
We assume a TA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv) and a set L ⊆ Σ of actions.
Deﬁnition 2.11 The restriction of a TA A with respect to the set of actions
L is A \ L = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ
′, Inv), where δ′ = {(q, a, φ, B, q′) ∈ δ | a ∈ L}.
Deﬁnition 2.12 The hiding of a TA A with respect to the set of actions L
is given by A/L = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ
′, Inv), where δ′ = {e/L | e ∈ δ}.
Proposition 2.13 Given a TA A, A \ L and A/L are TAs for all L ⊆ Σ.
Given a PTA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π), unprob(A) = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv)
gives the TA obtained from A by removing Π.
We introduce Nondeterministic Systems as a subcase of TAs.
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Deﬁnition 2.14 ANondeterministic System (NS) is a TA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv),
where X = ∅, φ = true for every e = (q, a, φ, B, q′) ∈ δ and Inv(q) = true for
every state q ∈ Q.
As X = ∅, there are no valuations of clocks, and therefore a conﬁguration
reduces to a state. Transitions and state invariants of a NS may have as a
constraint only the condition true. The class of NSs coincides with the class
of Nondeterministic Automata.
Operators and bisimulation deﬁned for TAs reduce in the subcase of NSs
to the analogous operators and bisimulation deﬁned in [10].
Given a TA A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv), we call untime(A) the NS obtained
as the region automaton of A, and by considering an empty set of clocks X.
Note that in the region automaton there is a transition between regions r and
r′ if and only if there is an admissible run σ of the TA such that there is a
step s
α
−→ s′ in σ where s ∈ r and s′ ∈ r′.
We shall use the same terminology for operators and bisimulation in the
diﬀerent models when this does not give rise to ambiguity.
Lemma 2.15 The following statements hold:
(i) Given PTAs A and A′, A ≈ A′ ⇒ unprob(A) ≈ unprob(A′)
(ii) Given PTAs A and A′, A ≈ A′ ⇒ untime(A) ≈ untime(A′)
(iii) Given PAs A and A′, A ≈ A′ ⇒ unprob(A) ≈ unprob(A′)
(iv) Given TAs A and A′, A ≈ A′ ⇒ untime(A) ≈ untime(A′).
Proof. For cases (i) and (iii), let us assume A = (Σ, X,Q, q0, δ, Inv,Π),
A′ = (Σ′, X ′, Q′, q′0, δ
′, Inv,Π′) and Aˆ constructed as in Deﬁnition 2.2. Since
A ≈ A′ for a weak bisimulation R, we have that for all (s, r) ∈ R, C ∈ SAˆ/R
and schedulers F , there exists a scheduler F ′ such that ProbF
Aˆ
(s, τ ∗α, C) =
ProbF
′
Aˆ
(r, τ ∗α, C) ∀α ∈ Σ ∪ {τ} ∪ IR>0. Now, if ProbF
Aˆ
(s, α, s′) > 0 for
some s′ ∈ C there exists a conﬁguration r′ and a scheduler F ′ such that
ProbF
′
Aˆ
(r, τ ∗α, r′) = ProbF
Aˆ
(s, α, s′) > 0. Therefore if s
α
−→ s′, then there ex-
ists r′ such that r
α
=⇒ r′ and, since s′ and r′ are in the same equivalence class,
there exists also a bisimulation R′ on SAˆnp such that (s
′, r′) ∈ R′, where Aˆnp
is constructed as in Deﬁnition 2.9 starting from unprob(A) and unprob(A′).
The same holds if we exchange the roles of s and r.
For cases (ii) and (iv), the implications hold by the construction of the
region automaton. Actually, for each run of a PTA (or TA), there is an anal-
ogous run for the PA (or NS) obtained with untime(A), with probabilities
preserved by the normalizing operations. Weak bisimulations are, therefore,
preserved. 
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3 Security Properties
Given a system model with the basic operators of restriction and hiding, to-
gether with a notion of observational equivalence, it is easy to set up a frame-
work for the analysis of information ﬂow.
In all of the formalisms presented in Section 2, a ﬁnite alphabet Σ of visi-
ble actions is assumed. A multilevel system interacts with agents conﬁned in
diﬀerent levels of clearance. In order to analyze the information ﬂow between
parties with diﬀerent levels of conﬁdentiality, the set of visible actions is par-
titioned into high level actions and low level actions. Formally, we assume the
set of possible actions Σ = ΣH ∪ ΣL, with ΣH ∩ ΣL = ∅. In the following,
with l, l′ . . . and h, h′, . . . we denote actions of ΣL and ΣH respectively. For
simplicity, we specify only two-level systems; note, however, that this is not a
real limitation, since it is always possible to deal with the case of more levels
by iteratively grouping them in two clusters.
A low level agent is able to observe the execution of all the steps labeled
with actions in ΣL and all the timed steps. The basic idea of Non-Interference
is that the high level does not interfere with the low level if the eﬀects of
high level communications are not visible by a low level agent. Finally, an
important assumption when dealing with Non-Interference analysis is that a
system is considered to be secure (no information ﬂow can occur) if there is
no interaction with high level agents (if high level actions are prevented).
We deﬁne Non-Interference properties, Probabilistic Timed Non-Interference
(PTNI), Probabilistic Non-Interference (PNI), Timed Non-Interference (TNI)
and Nondeterministic Non-Interference (NNI).
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given a system A in PTA (PA, TA, NS, resp.) A is PTNI
(PNI, TNI, NNI, resp.)-secure if and only if A/ΣH ≈ A \ ΣH .
In the deﬁnition above, A \ ΣH represents the isolated system, where all
high level actions are prevented. As we have seen, such a system is considered
secure due to the notion of Non-Interference. If the observational behavior of
the isolated system is equal to the behavior of A/ΣH , representing the system
which communicates with high level agents in an invisible manner for the low
agents point of view, A satisﬁes the security property.
Note that the PNI property is the BSPNI property deﬁned in [1], the TNI
property is an analogous of the tBSNNI property deﬁned in [11], and NNI is
the BSNNI property of [10].
The PTNI property, deﬁned in an environment where both probability and
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time are studied, is able to detect information ﬂow that may occur either due
to the probabilistic behavior of the system or due to the time when an action
occurs or due a combination of them.
Proposition 3.2 It is decidable whether a PTA (PA, TA, NS, resp.) A sat-
isﬁes the PTNI (PNI, TNI, NNI, resp.) property.
Proof. The result derives directly by the decidability of weak bisimulation for
all the models, and by the computable deﬁnitions of the operators of hiding
and restriction. 
The security properties deﬁned in the probabilistic and/or timed settings
are conservative extensions of the security properties deﬁned in the possibilistic
and/or untimed settings.
Proposition 3.3 The following implications hold:
• A ∈ PNI ⇒ unprob(A) ∈ NNI
• A ∈ TNI ⇒ untime(A) ∈ NNI
• A ∈ PTNI ⇒ unprob(A) ∈ TNI ∧ untime(A) ∈ PNI.
Proof. The implications follow by the bisimulation based deﬁnitions of the
security properties and by the conservativeness of the probabilistic weak bisim-
ulation (see Lemma 2.15). 
The converse implications do not hold. The integration of probability
and time adds new information that extends what is already known in the
nondeterministic case. Therefore, systems considered to be secure in a purely
possibilistic setting, may turn out to be insecure when considering aspects
either of probability or of time. This is shown in Examples 3.4 and 3.5.
Example 3.4 In Figure 1 we show a case of probabilistic information ﬂow
presented in [1]. We assume Inv(qi) = true for every i ∈ [0, 6]. Abstracting
away from probability, system A could be considered secure. In a purely
possibilistic setting, in both systems unprob(A)/ΣH and unprob(A) \ ΣH a
low level agent can observe the action l or the sequence ll′ without further
information about the execution of action h. It holds that unprob(A)/ΣH ≈
unprob(A) \ΣH and, therefore, unprob(A) ∈ NNI and unprob(A) ∈ TNI. In
a probabilistic framework, given p+r+q = 1, the high level action h interferes
with the probability of observing either a single action l or the sequence ll′.
Formally, in A \ΣH , a low level agent observes either the single action l with
probability p + r or the sequence ll′ with probability q. However, in A/ΣH
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A A \ ΣH A/ΣH
 q0
l,p
q1

l,q
q2

l′
q4
l, r q3

h
q5

l′
q6
 q0
l,p
q1

l,q
q2

l′
q4
l, r q3  q0
l,p
q1

l,q
q2

l′
q4
l, r q3

τ
q5

l′
q6
Fig. 1. A probabilistic covert channel.
A A \ ΣH A/ΣH
 q0 
h, 1
2 q1

l
x = 5
q3

l, 1
2
x = 0
q2
 q0

l x = 0
q2
 q0 
τ, 1
2 q1

l
x = 5
q3

l, 1
2
x = 0
q2
Fig. 2. A timing covert channel.
the single event l is observed with probability p and the sequence ll′ with
probability r+q. As a consequence we have A/ΣH ≈ A\ΣH , so that the PNI
and the PTNI properties reveal the probabilistic covert channel.
Example 3.5 In Figure 2 we show a case of timing information ﬂow. We
assume Inv(qi) = true for i ∈ [2, 3] and Inv(qi) = x ≤ 5 for i ∈ [0, 1]. Ab-
stracting away from time, system A could be considered secure. In an untimed
setting, in both systems untime(A)/ΣH and untime(A)\ΣH a low level agent
can observe only the action l executed with probability 1 without further in-
formation about the execution of action h. It holds that untime(A)/ΣH ≈
untime(A) \ ΣH , and, therefore, untime(A) ∈ PNI. In a timed framework,
given a clock x ∈ IR≥0, the high level action h interferes with the time of ob-
serving the action l. Formally, in A \ΣH , a low level agent observes the single
action l executed immediately. However, in A/ΣH the single event l could
either be observed immediately or when the clock x reaches value 5. A low
level agent, observing the event l when clock x has value 5 knows that action
h has occurred. As a consequence, we have A/ΣH ≈ A\ΣH , so that the PTNI
property reveals the timing covert channel. The same holds for unprob(A); in
this case the covert channel is detected by the TNI property.
For system A in Figure 1, untime(A) is not PNI, but unprob(A) ∈ TNI.
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On the contrary, for system A in Figure 2, unprob(A) is not TNI, but untime(A) ∈
PNI. This shows that the discerning powers of time and probability, as re-
gards the Non-Interference property, are incomparable as stated in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3.6 The following implications hold:
• ∃ PTA A : unprob(A) ∈ TNI ∧ untime(A) ∈ PNI
• ∃ PTA A : untime(A) ∈ PNI ∧ unprob(A) ∈ TNI.
If we can express both time and probability as in PTAs, we are able to
describe systems exhibiting information ﬂow that neither a formalism with
only probability nor a formalism with only time can express. For such systems
we are able to show that they are not PTNI, even if they are both PTI and
TNI, and therefore we are able to reveal a new covert channel.
Proposition 3.7 ∃A : A ∈ PTNI ∧unprob(A) ∈ TNI ∧untime(A) ∈ PNI.
Proof. Consider the PTA A in Figure 3. We assume Inv(qi) = true for
i ∈ {3, 4, 8, 9}, Inv(qi) = x ≤ 3 for i ∈ {0, 1, 5, 7} and Inv(qi) = x ≤ 4 for
i ∈ {2, 6}. It is easy to see that untime(A) ∈ PTI. In both untime(A)/ΣH
and untime(A) \ ΣH , a low level agent observes the single event l taken with
probability 1, and therefore untime(A)/ΣH ≈ untime(A)\ΣH . It is also easy
to see that unprob(A) ∈ TNI. In both unprob(A)/ΣH and unprob(A) \ΣH , a
low level agent could either observe the single event l taken when x = 3 or the
event l taken when x = 4, and therefore unprob(A)/ΣH ≈ unprob(A) \ ΣH .
Finally, we show that A is not PTNI. In a probabilistic and timed frame-
work, the high level action h interferes with the probability of observing the
action l executed either when x = 3 or when x = 4. Formally, in A \ ΣH ,
a low level agent observes the action l either when x = 3 or when x = 4
with probability 1
2
, respectively. However, in A/ΣH the event l taken when
x = 3 is observed with probability 19
30
, while the action l taken when x = 4
is observed with probability 11
30
. As a consequence, we have A/ΣH ≈ A \ ΣH ,
so that the PTNI properties reveals the probabilistic timing covert channel. 
The diagram in Figure 4 summarizes our results.
4 Conclusions
Other security properties have been introduced in the literature in order to
capture diﬀerent behaviors of systems that have to be considered insecure.
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Fig. 3. A probabilistic timing covert channel.
NNI
PNI
TNI
PTNI
Fig. 4. Relations among Non-Interference security properties.
In [10] Focardi and Gorrieri promote the classiﬁcation of a set of properties
capturing the idea of information ﬂow and Non-Interference. One of the most
interesting and intuitive properties is the Non Deducibility on Composition
(NDC), which states that a system A in isolation has not to be altered when
considering all the potential interactions of A with the high level agents of the
external environment. In [17] we deﬁned for PTAs a concept of parallel compo-
sition and the property Probabilistic Timed Non Deducibility on Composition
(PTNDC), and we have shown that A ∈ PTNDC ⇒ A ∈ PTNI. Analogous
results could be proven for the properties of Non Deducibility on Composition
and Non-Interference deﬁned for PAs, TAs and NSs.
Moreover, implications similar to those of Proposition 3.3 could be proven
for NDC security properties.
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